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INTRODUCTION
In 1993, Steve Emerson, terrorism expert and author of the
documentary film "Jihad in America," attended a conference of Islamic
radicals held at the Detroit, Michigan Renaissance Center. Knowing that
members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad would be present, Emerson
approached the FBI, suggesting that an agent attend to collect
intelligence. Without specific suspicion of criminal activity, however,
FBI agents could not participate, under the existing Attorney General
Guidelines. Emerson attended and heard known international
representatives of terrorist organizations advocate violence. He also
collected bomb-making manuals they distributed.'
In 1999, Sheikh Muhammed Hisham Kabbani, Head of the
Islamic Supreme Council of America, testified before an open forum at
* The author acknowledges with gratitude the invaluable advice given to her by
Professor Debra Livingston, Vice Dean and Paul J. Kellner Professor of Law,
Columbia Law School.
1 See Post-Cold War International Security Threats: Terrorism, Drugs, and
Organized Crime Symposium Transcript, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 527, 565-566
(1999).
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the State Department that eighty percent of mosques and Islamic
charities in the United States have been taken over by "extremists.
'2
During the making of his documentary, Steve Emerson witnessed this
first-hand. Hamas posters and recruitment literature papered the
vestibule of the Bridgeview Mosque Emerson visited in a suburb of
Chicago. Terrorist videos and manuals formed the bulk of its library
collection. In fact, when Israeli authorities charged Mohammad Jarad, a
member of the Mosque, with transferring money to terrorist groups, he
told them he had been sent on a "mission" by Jamal Said, the Bridgeview
Mosque's imam.3 Emerson also listened to speaker Abdullah Azzam
order his audience to "unsheathe his sword and fight to liberate
Palestine" at the 1998 First Conference in Jihad at the Al-Farooq Mosque
in Brooklyn. 4
These anecdotes raise the question of whether the FBI should be
authorized to attend mosque services and other religious events on the
same terms as the public. While attendance of religious services falls
within the core of activities protected by the First Amendment, former
Attorney General John Ashcroft believed that the FBI should exercise
this power to protect national security proactively. In 2002, he eased
decades-old restrictions on the FBI's authority to carry out surveillance,
proclaiming that the old rules "barred FBI field agents from taking the
initiative to detect and prevent future terrorist acts unless the FBI learns
of possible criminal activity from external sources." 5  The revised
guidelines Ashcroft enacted allow agents to attend public gatherings at
their individual discretion without requiring any preliminary criminal
finding. "People who hijack a religion and make out of it an implement
of war will not be free from our interest," he told ABC's "This Week.",
6
2 See STEVEN EMERSON, AMERICAN JIHAD: THE TERRORISTS LIVING AMONG US
160 (2002).
3 See id. at 12.4 Seeid. at 130.
5 John Ashcroft, Remarks of Attorney General, May 30, 2002,
http://www.usdoj .gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/53002agpreparedremarks.htm.
6 Religious Groups Could Be Monitored, Ashcroft Says, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Dec. 3, 2001.
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Meanwhile, critics counter that monitoring religious observance
"chills" individual behavior.7 The Washington Post reports that across
New York, mosques have suffered declines in both attendance and
charitable contributions as a direct result of Ashcroft's changes.8 The
Muslim Community Association, an Ann Arbor group sponsoring daily
prayers and educational programs, has sued Ashcroft, noting in its
complaint that attendance at its activities has fallen "because the FBI has
recorded conversations and services inside the mosque." 9 Other mosques
have expressed concern over the language used at services.'
0
Ashcroft's new formulation of the FBI's role brought it closer to
the unfettered position long enjoyed by the U.K.'s M15 security services.
As a pure domestic intelligence agency, the MI5 enjoys freedom to
monitor political and religious activities at will."
In the past, the U.S. and U.K. have struck different balances with
respect to the protection of civil liberties and the defense of national
security. The U.K.'s approach to counterterrorism developed through its
struggle to subdue violence perpetrated by the Irish Republican Army.
The guidelines governing the FBI prior to Ashcroft's revisions 1 were
adopted in the 1970s, following the revelation of widespread intelligence
abuses. The Senate Church Committee exposed an FBI where
7 See Floyd Abrams, Address: The First Amendment and the War Against
Terrorism, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 2 (2002-2003) (supporting a higher level of
surveillance, even as Abrams concedes that this chills free speech).
8 Lynne Duke, At a Brooklyn Mosque, Muslims Pray in the Shadow of
Terrorism, WASH. POST, April 16, 2003, at C 1.
9 See Complaint of the Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor, Muslin
Cmty. Assoc. et al. v. Ashcroft, No. 03-72913 (E.D. Mich. July 30, 2003)
[hereinafter "Complaint"].
'0 Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration
of Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1233 (2004).
" Id. See infra pt. III (discussing the United Kingdom's M 15 Security Service).
12 Two sets of guidelines govern FBI terrorism investigations: guidelines for
foreign intelligence and international terrorism and guidelines on general crimes,
racketeering and domestic terrorism. The Foreign Guidelines apply to the
investigation of foreign groups who carry out attacks in the United States. The
Domestic Guidelines apply to groups who both originate and operate
domestically. This Article discusses the revisions Ashcroft made to the
Domestic Guidelines.
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"opposition to government policy or the expression of controversial
views was frequently considered sufficient for collecting data on
Americans."' 3  The Committee concluded: "Where unsupported
determinations as to 'potential' behavior are the basis for surveillance of
groups and individuals, no one is safe from the inquisitive eye of the
intelligence agency."'4
This Article argues that while broad surveillance powers may
reflect the appropriate compromise between liberty and security in the
U.K., unlimited surveillance of First Amendment-protected activity is
improper in the context of U.S. history. Part I of this Article surveys the
FBI's historic misuse of its investigative authority. Part II details the
protections put in place once the FBI's abuses came to light. Part III
explains the structure of intelligence operations in the U.K., tracing this
legal framework to the history of Irish terrorist activity. Part IV contends
that the government should reinstate the requirement that FBI agents
allege suspicions of criminal activity before they conduct surveillance of
religious groups in recognition of the events that spurred the original
enactment of this requirement.
I. THE FBI'S TROUBLED PAST
The FBI's past excesses indicate that a lack of constraint on
intelligence can devolve into retribution against those holding non-
mainstream beliefs. In 1908, the FBI was formed under orders from
Attorney General Charles Bonaparte for the purpose of criminal
enforcement. Members of Congress debated whether to legislate checks
on the FBI's power but ultimately did not institute any protections
against abuse. 5 Part I of this article details the FBI's historic misuse of
its freedom to conduct covert investigations.
13 See SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES REPORT, S. REP. No. 94-755, Book II, at
169 (1976).
14 Id., Book II, at 177-78.
15 Id., Book III, at 379.
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A. War-time Intelligence
The Attorney General holds derivative power to issue guidelines
directing the FBI to investigate matters within the control of the
Department of Justice and the Department of State.' 6 Thus, while the
FBI's original mandate was to investigate violations of federal criminal
law, during World War I Attorney General George Wickersham and
Attorney General James McReynolds directed the Bureau's increasing
involvement in domestic intelligence. 7
As the War drew to a close, the FBI transferred its focus from
investigating war critics to the surveillance of radical groups. In 1919,
terrorist bombings within the United States, including "an explosion" on
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer's doorstep, triggered the creation
of a General Intelligence Division.' 8 The Division operated under a
directive to investigate "anarchistic and similar classes, Bolshevism, and
kindred agitations advocating change in the present form of
government." The result was the "Palmer Raids," a night on which FBI
agents detained more than 10,000 people in thirty-three cities, falsely
alleging that they were Communists. 19 During this period, the FBI also
began to compile dossiers detailing the political beliefs of suspected
radicals.
20
Upon taking office in 1924, Attorney General Harlan Fiske
Stone labeled the FBI as "lawless . . . and tyrannical.' He placed J.
Edgar Hoover in charge of restricting the Agency's activities to criminal
investigations.
22
In spite of this, President Roosevelt soon commanded the FBI to
investigate Nazi activity and right-wing domestic threats. 23 Roosevelt
requested intelligence on "subversive activities in the United States ...
16 28 U.S.C. § 533 (1976).
'7 S. REP. No. 94-755, supra note 13, Book III, at 382.
18 id.
'9 Id. at 383-84.20 Id. at 386.
21 Id. at 388.
22 Id.
23Id. at 393.
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as may affect the economic and political life of the country as a whole. 2 4
The FBI fulfilled this directive by creating an index of more than 2,500
people suspected of Communist and Nazi activities. Roosevelt's orders
did not limit the FBI's domestic intelligence collection to violations of
the law. 5
In 1940, Attorney General Robert Jackson informed state
officials that the FBI was engaged in a program of "steady surveillance
over individuals and groups within the United States who are so
sympathetic with the systems or designs of foreign dictators. 26 Utilizing
its unbounded authority, the FBI monitored participants in lawful
domestic political activities, including members of the League for Fair
Play, a group that supplied the Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs with speakers,
and members of the Independent Voters of Illinois.
27
B. Post-war "Subversive" Targeting
By the close of the Second World War, the FBI was embroiled in
"pure intelligence" programs directed against domestic "subversives.', 28
Under Director Hoover's instructions, the agency expanded its efforts to
investigate and create files on all Communist Party members. The FBI
undertook surveillance of organized labor, alleged Communist front
organizations, racial groups, nationality groups, youth organizations,
political activists, the motion picture industry, and science and research
professionals.29
By 1951, the FBI maintained records on 13,901 individuals in its
Security Index and over 200,000 individuals in its Communist Indexes.
The 1951 FBI Manual stated it was "not possible to formulate any hard-
and-fast standards for measuring the dangerousness of individual
members or affiliates of revolutionary organizations." Thus, "Where
there is doubt an individual may be a current threat . . . the questions
24 Id. at 394.
21 Id. at 396.
26 Id. at 411.
27Id. at 415.
21 Id. at 449.
29 S. REP. No. 94-755, supra note 13, Book II, at 47 (1976).
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should be resolved in the interest of security and investigation [sic]
conducted.
30
The NAACP was a particular target of the FBI's Communist-
infiltration activities. In 1957, the FBI's New York Field Office
compiled a 137-page manuscript detailing its findings on the
organization, even though an informant had reported the NAACP's
extension of a resolution barring membership to those with Communist
ties.3 '
The FBI also began to investigate other racial groups, including
Klan-like organizations and individuals associated with the Nation of
Islam, the John Birch Society, and the Christian Nationalist Crusade.
Despite the FBI's acknowledgment that it lacked authority over general
racial matters, the FBI's Manual stated, "[a]s an intelligence function the
Bureau does have the responsibility of advising . . .on all pertinent
information obtained concerning [these groups]. 32
As concerns over civil rights demonstrations, urban violence,
and Vietnam protests replaced the Communist fears of the 1950's, the
FBI continued to pursue a domestic intelligence, rather than law
enforcement approach to these problems. FBI agents were charged with
reporting on the political speech of the Klu Klux Klan and other "hate
groups." 33  Agents investigated the leaders and members of "black
nationalist groups" because they were seen as a "threat to internal
security." 34 The FBI engaged in such substantial overreaching that Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Coalition
were investigated as "radical and violence-prone" groups. 35 Agents took
pictures at civil rights demonstrations, including one in celebration of the
anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation.
36
Intelligence investigations also targeted antiwar demonstrators.
37
Informants attended antiwar teach-ins and conferences sponsored by the
30 Id.
"' Id., Book III, at 450.
31 Id. at 456.
33 Id. at 475-89.
34 Id. at 477.
35 id.
36/d. at 489.37Id. at 483.
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Universities Committee on Problems of War and Peace and reported the
text of all speeches.38 The FBI also conducted name checks on those
who signed petitions critical of U.S. policy in Vietnam and of those who
wrote letters to Senator Wayne Morse supporting his critiques of the
Vietnam War.39
From 1956 through 1971, the FBI's COINTELPRO operation
aimed to "neutralize or disrupt" the groups it targeted.40 The Bureau
aimed to prevent the exercise of First Amendment speech and
associational rights, asserting that protecting national security
necessitated prevention of the growth of dangerous groups and the
propagation of dangerous ideas. 4' Attorney General William Saxbe's
1974 report on COINTELPRO described its tactics as "abhorrent in a
free society.
' 42
Religious groups also caught the FBI's attentions. According to
FBI documents, agents conducted surveillance on Holiness-Pentecostal,
Baptist, African Methodist, Muslim, and Spiritualist congregations. The
agency particularly scrutinized the Church of God in Christ, the Saints of
Christ, and "Daddy Grace's" House of Prayer and maintained dossiers on
Black churches with missions in Africa.43
C. 1970s Backlash
In February 1971, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by Senator Sam J. Ervin of
North Carolina, began hearings to address citizens' "fear[s] about
exercising their rights under the First Amendment to sign petitions, or to
speak and write freely on current issues of Government policy."" While
testifying before the Subcommittee, Robert Mardian, Assistant Attorney
General and head of the Justice Department's Internal Security Unit,
confessed that the Justice Department and FBI had no "specific
38 Id. at 487.
39 Id. at 489.
4 Id., Book II, at 3.
41 id.
42 Id. at 73.
43 id.
44 S. REP. No. 94-755, supra note 13, Book II, at 73-77 (1976).
224 [VOL. 14:2
2006] U.S. & U.K. APPROACHES TO WAR ON TERROR
published regulations" guiding intelligence collection related to civil
disturbances.45
The scope of abuse did not surface until 1975, when the Church
Committee in the Senate and the Pike Committee in the House convened
to review the FBI's activities.46 The Church Committee's inquiry lasted
for fifteen months.47 Its final report detailed a 25-year investigation of
the NAACP, 48 surveillance on every Black Student Union in the
country, 49 a 31-year infiltration of the Socialist Workers Party,
50
harassment of the Women's Liberation Movement, 51 and 17,528
52domestic investigations of individual citizens. The Church
Committee's final report makes clear that groups and individuals were
investigated because of their political stance, not because of any
proclivity towards criminal activity. 53 The report states:
Virtually every element of our society has been
subjected to excessive government-ordered intelligence
inquiries. Opposition to government policy or the
expression of controversial views was frequently
considered sufficient for collecting data on Americans.
The committee finds that this extreme breadth of
intelligence activity is inconsistent with the principles of
our Constitution which protect the rights of speech,
political activity, and privacy against unjustified
governmental intrusion.54
45 Id. at 548-58.
46 See id.; see also CIA, THE PIKE REPORT (Spokesman Books 1977).
47 See William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority For National
Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 33 (2000).
48 S. REP. No. 94-755, supra note 13, Book II, at 8.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 7.52Id. at 19.
53 See Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling,
Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIz. L. REV. 621, 621 (2004).
54 S. REP. No. 94-755, supra note 13, Book II, at 169 (1976).
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II. ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES
The Church Committee's final report generated several results.
Both the House and the Senate established permanent intelligence
oversight committees. 55 President Ford issued an executive order placing
limits on the FBI's investigative activities.56  In addition, President
Ford's Attorney General Edward Levi issued internal guidelines
curtailing the FBI's ability to conduct political surveillance.57
Attorney Generals may issue guidelines defining the FBI's
investigatory powers. 8  Such guidelines, though not explicitly
enforceable in court, both regulate FBI activity and form a template
against which judges may review the propriety of investigations.5 9 These
guidelines thus shape the degree to which governmental investigations
respect civil liberties, and the FBI's compliance with them has
influenced recent litigation settlements.6°
The Levi Guidelines created a framework that ensured against
intrusions into First Amendment-protected activities, without an
adequate evidentiary predicate. The Smith Guidelines retained this basic
framework, while recognizing the need for government, in certain
circumstances, to undertake the long-term surveillance of dangerous
enterprises. The Ashcroft Guidelines, by contrast, reinstated a dangerous
authority to initiate surveillance without predication.
A. Levi Guidelines
The guidelines Attorney General Levi enacted following the
Church Committee hearings restricted FBI investigations according to
their type. The Levi Guidelines permitted the FBI to commence a
" H.R. Res. 658, 95th Cong.(1977); S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976).
56 Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 C.F.R. (1976).
57 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATION,
reprinted in JOHN T. ELLIFF, THE REFORM OF FBI INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
196-202 (1979) [hereinafter "LEVI GUIDELINES"].
58 28 U.S.C. § 533 (1976).
59 John T. Elliff, The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69.
CORNELL L. REV. 785, 786 (1984).
60 See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 575, 583
(D.C. Ill., 1983).
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"preliminary investigation" on the basis of "allegations or other
information that an individual or a group may be engaged in activities
which involve or will involve the use of force or violence and which
involve or will involve the violation of federal law."6' The Levi
Guidelines limited such investigations to confirmation or negation of the
charge and restricted their duration to ninety days.
62
A "full investigation" was only "authorized on the basis of
specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual
or a group is or may be engaged in activities which involve the use of
force or violence and which involve or will involve the violation of
federal law." 63 A "full investigation" also required permission from FBI
headquarters 64 and annual review by the Department of Justice to
"determine in writing whether continued investigation was warranted.,
65
In essence, investigations conforming to the Levi Guidelines had to be
"designed and conducted so as not to limit the full exercise of rights
protected by the Constitution and U.S. Laws."
66
By the end of the 1970s, the number of domestic security
investigations occurring under the Levi Guidelines had decreased
substantially. 67 In 1983, when President Reagan's Attorney General
William French Smith decided to update the Levi Guidelines, his reforms
overall cemented the shift away from the FBI's pre-Levi orientation
towards internal security to a focus on criminal intelligence and law
enforcement.68
61 LEVI GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at 197.
61Id. at 197-98.
63 Id. at 198.
64 id.
61 Id. at 200.
66 1d. at 196-197.
67 Gregory R. Stone, The Reagan Administration, the First Amendment and
F.B.I. Domestic Security Investigations, in FREEDOM AT RISK 272, 276-77
(Richard 0. Curry ed., 1988).
68 Elliff, supra note 59, at 796.
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B. Smith Guidelines
Attorney General Smith articulated his purpose as ensuring
"protection of the public from the greater sophistication and changing
nature of domestic groups that are prone to violence." 69 He updated and
made explicit the FBI's ability to launch investigations based on
suspicious statements, its authorization to conduct "preliminary
inquiries," and the terms upon which it could launch "full
investigations."
Although the Levi Guidelines did not address investigations
based solely on statements, the Smith Guidelines made clear:
In its efforts to anticipate or prevent crime, the FBI must
at times initiate investigations in advance of criminal
conduct. It is important that such investigations not be
based solely on activities protected by the First
Amendment or on the lawful exercise of any other rights
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
When, however, statements advocate criminal activity or
indicate an apparent intent to engage in crime,
particularly crimes of violence, an investigation under
these guidelines may be warranted unless it is apparent,
from the circumstances or the context in which the
statements are made, that there is no prospect of harm.
70
The Smith Guidelines abolished separate "preliminary inquiries"
for domestic security purposes. Smith authorized only "preliminary
inquiries" related to general crimes.71  This change reflected the
69 Press Release, Department of Justice (Mar. 7, 1983), reprinted in Attorney
General's Guidelines for Domestic Security Investigations (Smith Guidelines):
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 9 8 th Cong. 47 (1983).
70 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING
ENTERPRISE AND DOMESTIC SECURITY/TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS§ I,
reprinted in FBI Domestic Security Guidelines: Oversight Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong.67, 69 (1983) [hereinafter SMITH GUIDELINES].
71 Id. § II.B.
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recognition that prior to 1976, the FBI had undertaken "preliminary
inquiries" for domestic security purposes, based upon an individual's
political association or political expression. While such investigations
had generated copious individual files, they had not contributed
meaningfully to law enforcement. 72  Furthermore, history had
demonstrated the FBI's frequent initiation of "preliminary inquiries" to
monitor members of mistrusted groups. In 1971, the FBI had screened
all Black student leaders across the country, for the purpose of
identifying members of militant groups such as the Black Panthers. 3
Under the Smith Guidelines, "undisclosed participation in the activities
of an organization by an undercover employee or cooperating private
individual in a manner that may influence the exercise of rights protected
by the First Amendment" necessitated approval from FBI headquarters,
with notification to the Department of Justice.74 The FBI would also be
"required to use the least intrusive means of surveillance possible., 75
Whereas the Levi Guidelines permitted investigations of groups
as well as of individuals engaged in activities that "involve or will
involve the use of force or violence in violation of federal law, 76 the
Smith Guidelines stated that investigations should be "concerned with
. . . entire enterprises, rather than individual participants and specific
criminal acts."77 The Smith Guidelines also lowered the probable cause
standard found in the Levi Guidelines, enabling investigations "when
facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are
engaged in an enterprise to further political or social goals wholly or in
part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States. 78
The standards included in the Smith Guidelines struck a
workable balance. The "reasonable indication of violence" requirement
and the obligation to adhere to the defined scope of an investigation
addressed many of the abuses seen under FBI Director Hoover without
72 S. REP. No. 94-755, supra note 13, at 138-47 (1976).
71 Id. at 527.
74 Id. § IV.B.3.
71 SMITH GUIDELINES, supra note 70, § II.B.4.
76 LEVI GUIDELINES, supra note 57, § I.A.4.
77 SMITH GUIDELINES, supra note 70, § III.B.
7 8 Id. § III.B. Ia.
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sacrificing results. Under the Smith Guidelines, the FBI successfully
investigated mosques, after documenting suspicious activity.
79
In the 1980s, the INS lawfully infiltrated Arizona churches under
similar standards. After Presbyterian minister John Fife proclaimed to
the media that his church was smuggling illegal aliens from Central
America, and therefore violating federal immigration law, INS agents
initiated an undercover operation. 80  Informants attended religious
services over the course of nine months,8' and the government
successfully convicted eight of eleven defendants with the evidence it
had gathered.82 Though some of the monitored churches brought suit
against the government for "chilling" their religious liberty, the court did
not rule to prohibit undercover infiltration of churches.83
Following the Oklahoma City bombing, the FBI investigated
right-wing religious groups, including the Christian Identity Movement.
84
Though some members of Congress proposed amending the Smith
Guidelines to permit broader surveillance,85 FBI Director Louis Freeh,
Attorney General Janet Reno, and Deputy Attorney General Jamie
Gorelick agreed that the Smith guidelines afforded the FBI sufficient
power to investigate terrorist threats.
86
79 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM -F.B.I.
INVESTIGATES DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES TO IDENTIFY TERRORISTS 22-23, 38
(1990).
80 United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 1989).
81 Wayne King, Churches Sue U.S., Alleging Illegal Acts in Inquiry on Aliens,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan 14, 1986, at Al.
82 Lininger, supra note 10, at 1220.
83 Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 521-23 (9th Cir.
1989); Presbyterian Church v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Ariz. 1990).
84 See FBI, PROJECT MEGIDDO, available at
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps3578/www.fbi.gov/library/megiddo/megidd
o.pdf. (last visited February 27, 2006).
85 See David M. Park, Re-examining the Attorney General's Guidelines for
F.B.I. Investigations of Domestic Groups, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 769, 769 (1997)
(explaining that several politicians in Congress suggested broadening the
guidelines to help prevent future attacks).
86Id. at 770.
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C. New Ashcroft Guidelines
Attorney General John Ashcroft's 2002 revisions significantly
rolled back Levi and Smith's limitations. Ashcroft's Guidelines state
that "for the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist activities, the
FBI is authorized to visit any place and attend any event that is open to
the public, on the same terms and conditions as members of the public
generally. '87  The new guidelines authorize FBI agents to initiate
"preliminary investigations" with permission from a Special Agent in
Charge, rather than from FBI Headquarters, and they also lengthen the
time period in which FBI agents may conduct these inquiries.
8
The FBI has made use of this new power to conduct surveillance
of First Amendment activities by targeting mosques and other political
meetings for undercover investigation. 89  The FBI has confirmed its
surveillance of mosques in several U.S. cities.90 The Department of
Justice has endorsed FBI instructions to local police directing them to
convey reports of irregular behavior at antiwar rallies.9' Previously, FBI
87 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERALS GUIDELINES ON GENERAL
CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE
INVESTIGATIONS (2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf (last visited February 27, 2006)
[hereinafter "2002 GUIDELINES"].
88 See id. at 17-18.
89 But see id. at 23 ("The law enforcement activities authorized by this Part do
not include maintaining files on individuals solely for the purpose of monitoring
activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of any other
rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.").
90 See House Comm. on the Judiciary, Sensenbrenner/Conyers Release Justice
Department Oversight Answers Regarding USA PATRIOT Act and War on
Terrorism, May 20, 2003, available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/partiotlet051303.pdf (citing U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ANSWERS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON THE USA PATRIOT
ACT 39-40 (May 13, 2003), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/patriotlet051303.pdf).
91 Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I Goes Knocking for Political Troublemakers, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004, at Al.
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attendance at a religious service or political event would have required
suspicion of specific criminal activity.
92
Appearing on ABC's news program "This Week" shortly after
announcing the revised guidelines, Attorney General Ashcroft stated that,
"[f]or so-called terrorists to gather over themselves some robe of
clericism ... and claim immunity from being observed, people who
hijack a religion and make out of it an implement of war will not be free
from our interest." 93 Ashcroft did not acknowledge that this immunity
grew from the FBI's historic abuse of its power.
III. THE BRITISH MODEL
Attorney General Ashcroft's revisions brought the F.B.I. closer
to the British intelligence model. No law limits the MI5 from attending
or monitoring political or religious events.94 In fact, the MI5 has
frequently directed local Special Branch officers to attend such
gatherings. 95 Subsection A of Part III of this Article sets out the structure
of MI5 and the legal framework in which it operates. Subsection B
contends that this scheme derives from the U.K.'s past dealings with
terrorism in Ireland.
A. The MI5"s Power
Unlike the FBI, which combines domestic intelligence with law
enforcement, MI5 functions solely as a domestic intelligence agency.
96
92 See LEVI GUIDELINES, supra note 57; § II.A-B; see SMITH GUIDELINES, supra
note 70, § IIA-B.
93 John Solomon, Religious Groups Could Be Monitored, Ashcroft Says, Dec. 2,
2001.
94 TOM PARKER, APPENDIX A: COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM, IN PRESERVING SECURITY AND DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS IN THE WAR
ON TERRORISM 129, 250 (Philip B. Heymann & Juliette N. Kayyem eds., 2005)
[hereinafter PARKER].
95 Id. (describing how the Special Branch comprises local detective officers).
96 See ABOUT MI5, at http://www.MI5.gov.uk/output/page7.html (last visited
February 27, 2006); see also Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the
Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The Guilt by Association Critique, 101 MICH.
L. REv. 1408, 1419 (2003).
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MI5 is explicitly prohibited from developing into a "secret police., 97 To
underscore its separation from law enforcement, MI5 cannot make
98
arrests or detentions.
Under a 1952 directive from Home Secretary Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe, a Director General heads MI5. 99 The Director General
reports M15's activities to the Home Secretary, who is a member of the
British Cabinet. Parliament, however, has never approved this
arrangement. 100 As one of three intelligence agencies in the U.K., MI5 is
supplemented by M16, roughly the equivalent of the CIA, as well as the
Governmental Communications Headquarters, which functions similarly
to the National Security Agency ("NSA").' 0 1
MI5 enjoys a very broad charter. Its activities are governed
principally by the Security Service Act of 1989 and its 1996
amendments, the Intelligence Services Act of 1994, and the Regulations
of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000.102 The Security Service Act of
1989 articulates MI5's role as ensuring "the protection of national
security and, in particular, its protection against threats from espionage,
terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers
and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary
democracy by political, industrial or violent means."' 0 3 The Security
Service Act of 1996 describes MI5 as supporting law enforcement
agencies in the prevention and detection of serious crime.
10 4
97 See MI5 I Myths & FAQs, at http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/PageI19.html
(last visited February 27, 2006).
98 See Security Service Act, 1996, c. 35 (Eng.).
99 See TRIB. OF INQUIRY, THE PROFUMO-CHRISTINE KEELER AFFAIR, 1963,
Cmnd. 2152, para. 230.
'oo Ian Leigh, The Security Service, the Press and the Courts, PUB. L. 12,
13(1987).
'' TODD MASSE, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM:
APPLICABILITY OF THE MI5 MODEL TO THE UNITED STATES 4 (May 19, 2003),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31920.pdf (last visited February 27,
2006).
102 
id.
103 Security Service Act, 1989, c. 5, § 1(2) (Eng.).104 Security Service Act, 1996, c. 35, § 1(1)(4).
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Though nominally under the direction of the Home Secretary,
MI5 is largely "self-tasking."' 0 5 Its statutory limitations are few: Section
2(2)(b) of the Security Service Act of 1996 bars the service from
"tak[ing] any action to further the interests of any political party.' 1 6 The
Intelligence Services Act of 1994 sets out guidelines establishing a
Parliamentary committee on Intelligence and Security, which reports
M15's activities to the Prime Minister.
10 7
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act ("RIPA"), passed in
2000, was intended to scale back the degree of discretion allowed for
surveillance. 10 8  Prior to RIPA, no redress existed for violations of
privacy. 1°9 The European Convention ("Convention"), signed by the
U.K. in 1950,'10 however, required its signatories to enforce the liberties
detailed therein, which include' "the right of privacy" 2 and the right of
redress. 113 Decisions of the European Court have decreed, moreover,
that legal guidelines regulate the use of covert surveillance. 14  The
105 PARKER, supra note 94, at 250.
106 Intelligence Services Act, 1994, c. 13., § 2(2)(b) (Eng.).
107 Id. § 2(4) (Eng.).
108 See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, Explanatory Notes, c. 23,
para. 5.
109 See Cara Hirsch, Policing Undercover Agents in the United Kingdom:
Whether the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act Complies With Regional
Human Rights Obligations, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1282, 1307 (2002).
110 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Apr. 11, 1950, CETS No.:005 (entered into force Mar. 9, 1953), available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm (last visited
February 27, 2006).
1 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. no. 5, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, art. I ("The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this
Convention.").
112 Id. art 8. ("Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ").
"' Id. art. 13. ("Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy").
114 See Kopp v. Switzerland, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 91, para. 4 (1999); see also Klass
v. Germany, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 214, para. 3 (1979-80).
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Convention and the European Court's decisions combined to pressure the
U.K. to govern its agents' actions more formally." 
5
RIPA instituted a regulatory framework consisting of three broad
categories of activity: "directed surveillance,"116  "intrusive
surveillance," ' 1 7 and the "conduct and use of covert human intelligence
sources."' 118  "Directed surveillance" refers to covert surveillance
undertaken pursuant to a specific investigation that is likely to unearth
private information. 119 "Intrusive surveillance" means covert surveillance
of a private residence or vehicle. 20  A "covert human intelligence
source" is someone who enters a relationship in order to gain information
covertly.
121
Covert surveillance that does not fit any of RIPA's three
categories continues to require no prior authorization.' 22 The right to
attend or record a public meeting remains unchanged. M15, moreover,
continues to enjoy a broad mandate to pursue behavior falling within the
RIPA categories, since the requirements RIPA establishes are minimal.
Authorization for both "directed surveillance" and "covert human
intelligence" is subject to purely internal oversight. Permission is
granted if a "designated" person 123 deems the surveillance both
"proportionate to what is sought to be achieved"'24 and "necessary.' 25
Anything in the interests of national security; for the purpose of
protecting public health; for the purpose of assessing or collecting any
tax, duty or levy payable to a government department; or for any purpose
specified by an order of the Secretary of State qualifies as "necessary. 126
Persons "designated" to make this determination may include police,
115 See Hirsch, supra note 109, at 1314-15.
116 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23, pt. II, § 26(1)(a).
7 Id. § 26(1)(b).8 Id. § 26(1)(c).
"
9 ld. § 26(2).
120 Id. § 26(3).
121 Id. § 26(8).
122 Id. § 26.
1231 d. §§ 28(l), 29(l).
124 Id. §§ 28(2)(b), 29(2)(b).
125 Id. §§ 28(2)(a), 29(2)(a).
126 Id. §§ 28(3), 29(3).
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intelligence and security services personnel, Customs and Excise
officers, members of the armed forces, and any other authority
designated by the Secretary of State. 27  Similarly, a broad list of
authorities may authorize "intrusive surveillance" so long as it is
necessary" and "proportionate."
'128
B. The Irish Template for UK Counter Terrorism
In February 2004, British Home Secretary David Blunkett, in his
discussion paper "Counter-terrorism Powers: Reconciling Security and
Liberty in an Open Society," wrote that "[t]he UK has some of the most
developed and sophisticated anti-terrorist legislation in the world. This
is principally because of our longstanding experience concerning
terrorism relating to the affairs of Northern Ireland."' 129 The scheme of
antiterrorist policy in the U.K. derives from that country's efforts to
control the struggle in Northern Ireland.
As early as the late 1800s, U.K. legislators, determined to
address the Northern Irish threat through ordinary criminal law, created
many new ordinances.' 30  The Explosive Substances Act of 1883, for
example, made it a criminal offense to "make, possess, or control an
explosive substance with intent to cause an explosion likely to endanger
life.' 3 ' The perpetrator of a bombing would thus be charged with
murder and with violation of the Explosive Substances Act.
Much of the criminal law the U.K. developed to manage
violence in Ireland remains integral to its contemporary security
efforts. 132 The proscription on "unlawful associations" found in the
127 Id. § 30.
128 Id. § 32.
129 HOME DEP'T, COUNTER-TERRORISM POWERS: RECONCILING SECURITY AND
LIBERTY IN AN OPEN SOCIETY: A DISCUSSION PAPER, 2004, Cm. 6147, quoted
in Ben Brandon, Terrorism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law: 120 Years of
the UK's Legal Response to Terrorism, CRIM. L. REv. 981, 981 (2004)
[hereinafter "Brandon"].
'
3 0 Id. at 982.
131 Explosive Substances Act, 1883, 12 & 13 Geo, c. 3, § (4)(1) (Eng.).
132 See Brandon, supra note 129, at 982.
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Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act of 1887 remains today.'
33
While the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act of 1922 applied only to
Northern Ireland, granting the Irish Minister of Home Affairs and the
police in his charge extraordinary powers, many of these special powers,
such as the authority to ban assemblies of proscribed groups and any
public display of their symbols, now apply to the U.K. as a whole.'
34
In the mid-1970s, the spread of violence to the mainland spurred
a series of Prevention of Terrorism Acts ("PTAs"), giving British
authorities emergency powers. After the bombing of two Birmingham
pubs in the mid-1970s, Parliament enacted its first PTA in just forty-
eight hours.'3 5 The PTA conferred on Parliament the power to outlaw
terrorist groups first seen in the Irish SPA and granted the Secretary of
State authority to exclude terrorist suspects from the U.K. Since then,
the PTA has been modified and reenacted several times, but it has
remained in continuous use.'
36
Because each iteration of the PTA was enacted on a semi-
permanent basis, U.K. lawyers regularly reviewed the effectiveness of
the legislation.' 37  In December of 1995, Lord Lloyd of Berwick
undertook an analysis "to consider the future need for specific counter-
terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom if the cessation of terrorism
connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland leads to a lasting peace."
He recognized that as the threat from Northern Ireland ebbed, global
terrorism would rise to take its place. 138 In 1998 the government agreed
that "the threat from international terrorist groups . . . means that
133 Compare Criminal Law and Procedure (Ireland) Act, 1887, 50 & 51 Vict., c.
20, § 7 (Ir.), with Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, c.
56 (Eng.).
134 See Brandon, supra note 129, at 982-83. Compare Civil Authorities (Special
Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922, sched. 3, § l(a), with Terrorism Act,
2000, c. 11, § 11 (Eng.).
135 See Brandon, supra note 129, at 986.
136 Clive Walker, Terrorism and Criminal Justice: Past, Present and Future,
CRIM. L. REV. 311, 312 (2004).
137 See Brandon, supra note 129,at 986.
138 HOME DEP'T, INQUIRY INTO LEGISLATION AGAINST TERRORISM BY THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD LLOYD OF BERWICK, 1996, Cm. 3420, quoted in
Brandon, supra note 126,at 986.
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permanent U.K.-wide counter-terrorist legislation will be necessary even
when there is a lasting peace in Northern Ireland."' 139  The ensuing
reform process resulted in the Terrorism Act 2000.
Consisting of 131 sections and 16 schedules, the Terrorism Act
2000 takes previous legislation designed for Northern Ireland and
revamps it to counter global terrorism. 40 Its principal change is to the
definition of terrorism; it updates the PTA's language to be more
international in scope. 14 1 The Terrorism Act retains the Secretary of
State's power to outlaw organizations. This power originated in the Irish
Special Powers Act of 1922.142 Since 2000, when Parliament enacted the
Terrorism Act, the Secretary has added twenty-five Islamic organizations
to a formerly exclusively Irish list of proscribed groups. 143 Once an
organization is banned, it becomes a criminal offense to belong to it,
invite support for it, arrange a meeting supporting it, address a meeting to
encourage support for it, or display any insignia of membership in it.
144
Just three months after September 11, 2001, the U.K. addressed
the attacks by enacting the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
2001.145 The bill is long and complicated, containing 129 sections, but
its provisions have little bearing on surveillance. 146 The Prevention of
Terrorism Act 2005, which received royal assent on March 11, 2005,
amended Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, to
bring its detention provisions in line with the European Convention on
Human Rights. 147 The decision not to broaden clause 38 of the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, penalizing incitement of racial
hatred, to comprise incitement of religious hatred 148 suggests that the
139 See HOME DEP'T, LEGISLATION AGAINST TERRORISM, 1998,para. 6, available
at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm41/4178/4178.htm.
140 MI5 I ANTI-TERRORIST LEGISLATION, at
http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page70.html.
141 See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, pt. I, § 1.(1) (Eng.).
142 See id., pt. 1I, § 3.
143 See Brandon, supra note 129, at 988-89.
'44 Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, pt. II, §§ 11-13 (Eng.).
145 MI5 I ANTI-TERRORIST LEGISLATION, supra note 140.
146 See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.).
14 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts2005/20050002.htm.
14 See Adam Tomkins, Legislating Against Terror: The Anti-Terrorism, Crime
and Security Act 2001, PUB. L. 205, 207 (2002).
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U.K. would be unlikely to extend special safeguards from surveillance to
religious groups.
IV. ANALYSIS OF U.S. IMPORTATION OF U.K. LAW
Part IV of this Article argues that it is inappropriate to expand
American intelligence authority to mimic the U.K. model. Removing
limitations on the surveillance of First Amendment activity is improper
in the context of U.S. history. It is also unnecessary to the effective
defense of national security.
Using Ashcroft's revisions, the FBI has targeted mosques for
undercover investigation. FBI Director Robert Mueller has ordered a
count of all domestic mosques. 49 Others have charged that the FBI has
sent agents to mosque services and deployed surveillance cameras to
record membership.'
5 0
Although the Constitution places no limits on this exercise of
authority, lessons from the period that triggered the establishment of
Church Committee clearly demonstrate the need for restrictions. The
Supreme Court, in Laird v. Tatum, declined to rule against the
constitutionality of the surveillance of political dissidents.' 5' Instead, the
Court held that the plaintiff class that had alleged "chilling" of its First
Amendment rights lacked standing to plead a cause of action. 52 The
Court said that a plaintiff must demonstrate a direct injury; "subjective
chill" was insufficient.' 53 Thus, the "mere existence of a governmental
investigative and data-gathering activity" did not constitute a
constitutional injury.' 54 The Church Committee, however, determined
that "intelligence activities have a tendency to expand beyond their initial
scope as intelligence collection programs naturally generate ever-
increasing demands for new data 55 . . . investigations sweep in vast
149 Curt Anderson, F.B.I. Calls Its Mosque Survey Part of Broad Security Plan,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at A16.
150 Lininger, supra note 10, at 1205-06.
151 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
12Id. at3, 11.
' Id. at 13-14.
'
54 Id. at 10.
155 S. REP. No. 94-755, supra note 13, Book II, at 4-5 (1976).
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
amounts of information about the personal lives, views, and association
of American citizens.' 56 Moreover, the collection of large amounts of
personal data threatens politicization and the possibility of retaliatory
uses.
Recent history also shows that tailored limits to surveillance do
not inhibit effective law enforcement. True, many terrorists involved in
the September 11 plot attended U.S. mosques,' 57 and fourteen members
of Brooklyn's Al-Farooq Mosque joined the 1993 conspiracy to bomb
the World Trade Center. 58 The Levi and Smith frameworks, however,
did not create a legal loophole for mosques, as evidenced by the
successful investigations of Arizona churches and right wing groups
related to the Oklahoma City bombing.
59
Moreover, the infringement of religious freedoms carries
significant costs. In its suit against the government, the Muslim
Community Association reported decreased attendance at services and
reduced levels in the charitable donations Islamic faith mandates. 60 The
lawsuit shows that religious surveillance can alienate the communities
whose cooperation is most essential in fighting terrorism. In addition,
religious expression has long enjoyed special protection within the
American legal system. A place of worship is a place of refuge and
introspection; an individual's experience there is deeply personal.
Christian and Jewish leaders have jointly condemned the practice of
monitoring mosques, absent a suspicion of criminal activity.'
61
156 See id.
157 Toni Locey, Al-Qaeda Records Solve Many 9/11 Puzzles, But Others Linger;
Arrest In Pakistan Gives Terror Probe New Focus, U.S.A. TODAY, Aug. 29,
2002, at 2A.
158 Lynne Duke, Worship and Worry; At a Brooklyn Mosque, Muslims Pray in
the Shadow of Terrorism, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2003, at C11.
159 See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text; see also STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, LAW
ENFORCEMENT, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11 at 61-63
(2002) (arguing that the FBI's problems are much less about legal authority than
about language skills and manpower).
160 See Complaint, supra note 9, at 11.
161 Jessica Reaves, Will Potential Surveillance Chill Churches? Attorney
General Ashcrofi Indicates He May Be Prepared to End a 1970s-Era Ban on
Watching Religious Groups Suspected of Illegal Activities, TIME, Dec. 3, 2001.
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The government should reinstate the requirement that
undercover investigations of religious activities be predicated on law
enforcement rather than on profiling of an individual's beliefs. Religious
expression has not correlated with criminality in the past. Although 700
Muslim men from New York and New Jersey were detained following
September 11, their questioning revealed scant links to terrorism.
62
Surveillance based on evidence of criminal activity, originally
recommended by the Church Committee in 1976,163 strikes a more fair
balance between national security interests and rights of association. In
fact, the "reasonable suspicion" requirement of the Smith Guidelines'
64
was recently introduced in Denver, Colorado as part of a consent decree
in a police spying case.
65
CONCLUSION
Reinstating the ability of the FBI to surveil First Amendment
activity without criminal evidence may mimic the U.K. model, but it is
improper in the context of U.S. history and unnecessary for the effective
defense of national security. The FBI's past excesses indicate that a lack
of constraint on intelligence can devolve into retribution against those
holding non-mainstream beliefs.
162 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE
TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH
THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS ( 2003), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/detainees.pdf.
163 See Fisher, supra note 53; S. REP. NO. 94-755, supra note 13, Book II, at 169
(1976); ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI'S GUIDELINES, supra note 55, at 197.
164 See ATTORNEY GENERAL SMITH'S GUIDELINES, supra note 70, § III.B.la
165 Kevin Vaughan, Police Will Still Gather Intelligence; But 'Spy Filed'
Settlement Places Restrictions on How It Can Be Done, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
Apr. 18, 2003, at 12A.
